JupyterLab 4.5.0 enabled copying and pasing cells through the system clipboard. The paste path parses clipboard text as cell JSON and inserts the cells without clearing metadata.trusted, so a payload can declare its own output as trusted. JupyterLab does not sanitize a trusted output and evaluates the <script> elements it contains, so pasting the cell runs attacker's JavaScript in the JupyterLab origin. The same payload with "trusted": false is sanitized.
jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. Prior to 4.5.7, JupyterLab's HTML sanitizer allowlists data-commandlinker-command and data-commandlinker-args on button elements, while CommandLinker listens for all click events on document.body and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.7.
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Latest patch release: 7.5.7
Latest minor release: 7.7.0a2
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